Obfuscation thru Polymorphism and Instantiation

The goal of this writeup is to create an additional layer of defense versus analysis.
A lot of malwares utilize this technique in order for the binary analysis make more harder.

Polymorphism is an important concept of object-oriented programming. It simply means more than one form. That is, the same entity (function or operator) behaves differently in different scenarios

www.programiz.com

We can implement polymorphism in C++ using the following ways:

  1. Function overloading
  2. Operator overloading
  3. Function overriding
  4. Virtual functions

Now, let’s get it working. For this article, we are using a basic class named HEAVENSGATE_BASE and HEAVENSGATE.

Fig1: Instantiation

Then we will be calling a function on an Instantiated Object.

Fig2: Call to a function

Normal Declarations

Fig3: We have a pointer named HEAVENSGATE_INSTANCE.

When we examine the function call (Fig2) under IDA, we get the result of:

Fig4: Direct Call to HEAVENSGATE::InitHeavensGate

and when we cross-reference the functions, we will see on screen:

Fig5: xref HEAVENSGATE::InitHeavensGate

The xref on the .rdata is a call from VirtualTable of the Instantiated object. And the xref on the InitThread is a call to the function (Fig2).

Basic Obfuscation

So, how do we apply basic obfuscation?

We just need to change the declaration of Object to be the “_BASE” level.

Fig6: A pointer named HEAVENSGATE_INSTANCE pointer to HEAVENSGATE_BASE

Unlike earlier, the pointer points to a class named HEAVENSGATE. But this time we will be using the “_BASE”.

Under the IDA, we can see the following instructions:

Fig7: Obfuscated call

Well, technically, it isn’t obfuscated. But the thing is, when an analyzer doesn’t have the .pdb file which contains the symbols name, then it will be harder to follow the calls and purpose of a certain call without using debugger.

This disassembly shows exactly what is going on under the hood with relation to polymorphism. For the invocations of function, the compiler moves the address of the object in to the EDX register. This is then dereferenced to get the base of the VMT and stored in the EAX register. The appropriate VMT entry for the function is found by using EAX as an index and storing the address in EDX. This function is then called. Since HEAVENSGATE_BASE and HEAVENSGATE have different VMTs, this code will call different functions — the appropriate ones — for the appropriate object type. Seeing how it’s done under the hood also allows us to easily write a function to print the VMT.

Fig8: Direct function call is now gone

We can now just see that the direct call (in comparison with Fig5) is now gone. Traces and footprints will be harder to be traced.

Conclusion

Dividing the classes into two: a Base and the Original class, is a time consuming task. It also make the code looks ugly. But somehow, it can greatly add protection to our binary from analysis.

Win11 22H2: Heaven’s Gate Hook

This won’t get too long. Just a quick fix for heavens gate hook (http://mark.rxmsolutions.com/through-the-heavens-gate/) as Microsoft updates the wow64cpu.dll that manages the translation from 32bit to 64bit syscalls of WoW64 applications.

To better visualize the change, here is the comparison of before and after.

Prior to 22h2, down until win10.
win11 22h2

With that being said, you cannot place a hook on 0x3010 as it would take a size of 8 bytes replacement. And would destroy the call mechanism even if you fix the displacement of call.

The solution

The solution is pretty simple. As in very very simple. Copy all the bytes from 0x3010 down until 0x302D. Fix the displacement only for the copied jmp at 0x3028. Then place the hook at 0x3010.
Basically, the copied gate (via VirtualAlloc or Codecave) will continue execution from original 0x3010. And so, the original 0x3015 and onwards will not be executed ever again.

Pretty easy right?

Notes

In the past, Microsoft tends to use far jump to set the CS:33. CS:33 signify that the execution will be a long 64 bit mode in order to translate from 32bit to 64bit. Now, they managed to create bridge without the need for far jmp. Lot of readings need to be cited in order to understand these new mechanism but please do let me know!

Abusing Windows Data Executing Privacy (DEP)

Data Execution Prevention (DEP) is a system-level memory protection feature that is built into the operating system starting with Windows XP and Windows Server 2003. DEP enables the system to mark one or more pages of memory as non-executable. Marking memory regions as non-executable means that code cannot be run from that region of memory, which makes it harder for the exploitation of buffer overruns.

DEP prevents code from being run from data pages such as the default heap, stacks, and memory pools. If an application attempts to run code from a data page that is protected, a memory access violation exception occurs, and if the exception is not handled, the calling process is terminated.

DEP is not intended to be a comprehensive defense against all exploits; it is intended to be another tool that you can use to secure your application.

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/memory/data-execution-prevention

How Data Execution Prevention Works

If an application attempts to run code from a protected page, the application receives an exception with the status code STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION. If your application must run code from a memory page, it must allocate and set the proper virtual memory protection attributes. The allocated memory must be marked PAGE_EXECUTEPAGE_EXECUTE_READPAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, or PAGE_EXECUTE_WRITECOPY when allocating memory. Heap allocations made by calling the malloc and HeapAlloc functions are non-executable.

Applications cannot run code from the default process heap or the stack.

DEP is configured at system boot according to the no-execute page protection policy setting in the boot configuration data. An application can get the current policy setting by calling the GetSystemDEPPolicy function. Depending on the policy setting, an application can change the DEP setting for the current process by calling the SetProcessDEPPolicy function.

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winnt/ns-winnt-exception_record

EXCEPTION_RECORD

typedef struct _EXCEPTION_RECORD {
  DWORD                    ExceptionCode;
  DWORD                    ExceptionFlags;
  struct _EXCEPTION_RECORD *ExceptionRecord;
  PVOID                    ExceptionAddress;
  DWORD                    NumberParameters;
  ULONG_PTR                ExceptionInformation[EXCEPTION_MAXIMUM_PARAMETERS];
} EXCEPTION_RECORD;

ExceptionInformation

An array of additional arguments that describe the exception. The RaiseException function can specify this array of arguments. For most exception codes, the array elements are undefined. The following table describes the exception codes whose array elements are defined.

Exception codeMeaning
EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATIONThe first element of the array contains a read-write flag that indicates the type of operation that caused the access violation. If this value is zero, the thread attempted to read the inaccessible data. If this value is 1, the thread attempted to write to an inaccessible address.If this value is 8, the thread causes a user-mode data execution prevention (DEP) violation.
The second array element specifies the virtual address of the inaccessible data.
EXCEPTION_IN_PAGE_ERRORThe first element of the array contains a read-write flag that indicates the type of operation that caused the access violation. If this value is zero, the thread attempted to read the inaccessible data. If this value is 1, the thread attempted to write to an inaccessible address.If this value is 8, the thread causes a user-mode data execution prevention (DEP) violation.
The second array element specifies the virtual address of the inaccessible data.
The third array element specifies the underlying NTSTATUS code that resulted in the exception.
ExceptionInformation table

The abuse!

VirtualProtect(&addr, &size, PAGE_READONLY, &hs.addressToHookOldProtect);

Set the target address into PAGE_READONLY so that if the address tries to execute/write, then it would result to an exception where we can catch the exception using VEH handler.

LONG WINAPI UltimateHooks::LeoHandler(EXCEPTION_POINTERS* pExceptionInfo)
{
	if (pExceptionInfo->ExceptionRecord->ExceptionCode == EXCEPTION_ACCESS_VIOLATION)
	{
		for (HookEntries hs : hookEntries)
		{
			if ((hs.addressToHook == pExceptionInfo->ContextRecord->XIP) &&
				(pExceptionInfo->ExceptionRecord->ExceptionInformation[0] == 8)) {
				//do your dark rituals here
			}
			return EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION;
		}

	}
	return EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_SEARCH;
}

As you can see, you just have to compare the ExceptionInformation[0] if it is 8 to verify if the exception is caused by DEP.

Simple AF!

What can I do with this?

Change the execution flow, modify the stack, modify values, mutate, and anything your imagination can think of! Just use your creativity!

POC

VEH Debugger
VEH Debugger
VEH Debugger via DEP

Conclusion

Thanks for viewing this, I hope you enjoyed this small writeup. Its been a while since I posted writeups, and may post again on some quite time. I am now currently shifting to Linux environment, should you expect that I will be having writeups on Linux, Web, Network, and Pentesting!

I am also planning to get some certifications such as CEH and OSCP, but I am not quite sure yet. But who knows? Ill just update it here whenever I came to a finalization.

Thanks and have a good day!~

DLL Injection via Thread Hijacking

Okay, so here is a small snippet that you can use for injecting a DLL on an application via “Thread Hijacking”. It’s much safer than injecting with common methods such as CreateRemoteThread. This uses GetThreadContext and SetThreadContext to poison the registers to execute our stub that is allocated via VirtualAllocEx which contains a code that will execute LoadLibraryA that will load our DLL. But this snippet alone is not enough to make your dll injection safe, you can do cleaning of your traces upon injection and other methods. Thanks to thelastpenguin for this awesome base.

FULL CODE

#include <fstream>
#include <iostream>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <Windows.h>
#include <TlHelp32.h>
#include <direct.h> // _getcwd
#include <string>
#include <iomanip>
#include <sstream>
#include <process.h>

#include <unordered_set>

#include "makesyscall.h"
#pragma comment(lib,"ntdll.lib")



using namespace std;

DWORD FindProcessId(const std::wstring&);
long InjectProcess(DWORD, const char*);

void dotdotdot(int count, int delay = 250);
void cls();

int main_scanner();
int main_injector();

string GetExeFileName();
string GetExePath();

BOOL IsAppRunningAsAdminMode();
void ElevateApplication();

__declspec(naked) void stub()
{
	__asm
	{
		// Save registers

		pushad
			pushfd
			call start // Get the delta offset

		start :
		pop ecx
			sub ecx, 7

			lea eax, [ecx + 32] // 32 = Code length + 11 int3 + 1
			push eax
			call dword ptr[ecx - 4] // LoadLibraryA address is stored before the shellcode

			// Restore registers

			popfd
			popad
			ret

			// 11 int3 instructions here
	}
}

// this way we can difference the addresses of the instructions in memory
DWORD WINAPI stub_end()
{
	return 0;
}
//

int main(int argc, char* argv) {
	main_injector();
	main_scanner();
}

BOOL IsAppRunningAsAdminMode()
{
	BOOL fIsRunAsAdmin = FALSE;
	DWORD dwError = ERROR_SUCCESS;
	PSID pAdministratorsGroup = NULL;

	// Allocate and initialize a SID of the administrators group.
	SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY NtAuthority = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
	if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(
		&NtAuthority,
		2,
		SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID,
		DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS,
		0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
		&pAdministratorsGroup))
	{
		dwError = GetLastError();
		goto Cleanup;
	}

	// Determine whether the SID of administrators group is enabled in 
	// the primary access token of the process.
	if (!CheckTokenMembership(NULL, pAdministratorsGroup, &fIsRunAsAdmin))
	{
		dwError = GetLastError();
		goto Cleanup;
	}

Cleanup:
	// Centralized cleanup for all allocated resources.
	if (pAdministratorsGroup)
	{
		FreeSid(pAdministratorsGroup);
		pAdministratorsGroup = NULL;
	}

	// Throw the error if something failed in the function.
	if (ERROR_SUCCESS != dwError)
	{
		throw dwError;
	}

	return fIsRunAsAdmin;
}
// 

void ElevateApplication(){
	wchar_t szPath[MAX_PATH];
	if (GetModuleFileName(NULL, szPath, ARRAYSIZE(szPath)))
	{
		// Launch itself as admin
		SHELLEXECUTEINFO sei = { sizeof(sei) };
		sei.lpVerb = L"runas";
		sei.lpFile = szPath;
		sei.hwnd = NULL;
		sei.nShow = SW_NORMAL;
		if (!ShellExecuteEx(&sei))
		{
			DWORD dwError = GetLastError();
			if (dwError == ERROR_CANCELLED)
			{
				// The user refused to allow privileges elevation.
				std::cout << "User did not allow elevation" << std::endl;
			}
		}
		else
		{
			_exit(1);  // Quit itself
		}
	}
}

string GetExeFileName()
{
	char buffer[MAX_PATH];
	GetModuleFileNameA(NULL, buffer, MAX_PATH);
	return std::string(buffer);
}

string GetExePath()
{
	std::string f = GetExeFileName();
	return f.substr(0, f.find_last_of("\\/"));
}

int main_scanner() {
	std::cout << "Loading";
	dotdotdot(4);
	std::cout << endl;

	cls();

	string processName = "Game.exe";
	string payloadPath = GetExePath() + "\\" + "hack.dll";

	cls();
	std::cout << "\tProcess Name: " << processName << endl;
	std::cout << "\tRelative Path: " << payloadPath << endl;

	std::wstring fatProcessName(processName.begin(), processName.end());
	
	std::unordered_set<DWORD> injectedProcesses;


	while (true) {
		std::cout << "Scanning";
		while (true) {
			dotdotdot(4);

			DWORD processId = FindProcessId(fatProcessName);
			if (processId && injectedProcesses.find(processId) == injectedProcesses.end()) {
				std::cout << "\n====================\n";
				std::cout << "Found a process to inject!" << endl;
				std::cout << "Process ID: " << processId << endl;
				std::cout << "Injecting Process: " << endl;

				if (InjectProcess(processId, payloadPath.c_str()) == 0) {
					std::cout << "Success!" << endl;
					injectedProcesses.insert(processId);
				}
				else {
					std::cout << "Error!" << endl;
				}
				std::cout << "====================\n";
				break;
			}
		}
	}
}

int main_injector() {
	cls();

	if (IsAppRunningAsAdminMode())
		return 1;
	else
		ElevateApplication();
}

void dotdotdot(int count, int delay) {
	int width = count;
	for (int dots = 0; dots <= count; ++dots) {
		std::cout << std::left << std::setw(width) << std::string(dots, '.');
		Sleep(delay);
		std::cout << std::string(width, '\b');
	}
}

void cls() {
	std::system("cls");
	std::cout <<
		" -------------------------------\n"
		"  Thread Hijacking Injector \n"

		" -------------------------------\n";
}

DWORD FindProcessId(const std::wstring& processName) {
	PROCESSENTRY32 processInfo;
	processInfo.dwSize = sizeof(processInfo);

	HANDLE processesSnapshot = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, NULL);
	if (processesSnapshot == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
		return 0;

	Process32First(processesSnapshot, &processInfo);
	if (!processName.compare(processInfo.szExeFile))
	{
		CloseHandle(processesSnapshot);
		return processInfo.th32ProcessID;
	}

	while (Process32Next(processesSnapshot, &processInfo))
	{
		if (!processName.compare(processInfo.szExeFile))
		{
			CloseHandle(processesSnapshot);
			return processInfo.th32ProcessID;
		}
	}

	CloseHandle(processesSnapshot);
	return 0;
}


long InjectProcess(DWORD ProcessId, const char* dllPath) {

	HANDLE hProcess, hThread, hSnap;
	DWORD stublen;
	PVOID LoadLibraryA_Addr, mem;

	THREADENTRY32 te32;
	CONTEXT ctx;

	// determine the size of the stub that we will insert
	stublen = (DWORD)stub_end - (DWORD)stub;
	cout << "Calculated the stub size to be: " << stublen << endl;


	// opening target process
	hProcess = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, ProcessId);

	if (!hProcess) {
		cout << "Failed to load hProcess with id " << ProcessId << endl;
		Sleep(10000);
		return 0;
	}

	// todo: identify purpose of this code
	te32.dwSize = sizeof(te32);
	hSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPTHREAD, 0);


	Thread32First(hSnap, &te32);
	cout << "Identifying a thread to hijack" << endl;
	while (Thread32Next(hSnap, &te32))
	{
		if (te32.th32OwnerProcessID == ProcessId)
		{
			cout << "Target thread found. TID: " << te32.th32ThreadID << endl;

			CloseHandle(hSnap);
			break;
		}
	}

	// opening a handle to the thread that we will be hijacking
	hThread = OpenThread(THREAD_ALL_ACCESS, false, te32.th32ThreadID);
	if (!hThread) {
		cout << "Failed to open a handle to the thread " << te32.th32ThreadID << endl;
		Sleep(10000);
		return 0;
	}

	// now we suspend it.
	ctx.ContextFlags = CONTEXT_FULL;
	SuspendThread(hThread);

	cout << "Getting the thread context" << endl;
	if (!GetThreadContext(hThread, &ctx)) // Get the thread context
	{
		cout << "Unable to get the thread context of the target thread " << GetLastError() << endl;
		ResumeThread(hThread);
		Sleep(10000);
		return -1;
	}

	cout << "Current EIP: " << ctx.Eip << endl;
	cout << "Current ESP: " << ctx.Esp << endl;

	cout << "Allocating memory in target process." << endl;
	mem = VirtualAllocEx(hProcess, NULL, 4096, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);

	if (!mem) {
		cout << "Unable to reserve memory in the target process." << endl;
		ResumeThread(hThread);
		Sleep(10000);
		return -1;
	}

	cout << "Memory allocated at " << mem << endl;
	LoadLibraryA_Addr = LoadLibraryA;

	cout << "Writing shell code, LoadLibraryA address, and DLL path into target process" << endl;

	cout << "Writing out path buffer " << dllPath << endl;
	size_t dllPathLen = strlen(dllPath);

	WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, mem, &LoadLibraryA_Addr, sizeof(PVOID), NULL); // Write the address of LoadLibraryA into target process
	WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, (PVOID)((LPBYTE)mem + 4), stub, stublen, NULL); // Write the shellcode into target process
	WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, (PVOID)((LPBYTE)mem + 4 + stublen), dllPath, dllPathLen, NULL); // Write the DLL path into target process

	ctx.Esp -= 4; // Decrement esp to simulate a push instruction. Without this the target process will crash when the shellcode returns!
	WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, (PVOID)ctx.Esp, &ctx.Eip, sizeof(PVOID), NULL); // Write orginal eip into target thread's stack
	ctx.Eip = (DWORD)((LPBYTE)mem + 4); // Set eip to the injected shellcode

	cout << "new eip value: " << ctx.Eip << endl;
	cout << "new esp value: " << ctx.Esp << endl;

	cout << "Setting the thread context " << endl;

	if (!SetThreadContext(hThread, &ctx)) // Hijack the thread
	{
		cout << "Unable to SetThreadContext" << endl;
		VirtualFreeEx(hProcess, mem, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
		ResumeThread(hThread);
		Sleep(10000);
		return -1;
	}

	ResumeThread(hThread);

	cout << "Done." << endl;

	return 0;
}

PoC

Thread Hijacking PoC

I think that’s all for this writeup. With that being said, this could be my last writeup for now as I am going very very busy for the next couple of months.

Thank you so much, and I hope you enjoyed this writeup!

root@sh3n:~/$ see_ya_again_soon_!

Walking through VEH handlers list

This writeup is just a PoC on getting the handlers list in win10.
This PoC was done in Win10 build 19041.

VEH is used to catch exceptions happening in the application, when the exceptions are caught, you have a chance to resolve the exceptions to avoid application crash.

Credits

Almost this whole writeup is written by Dimitri Fourny and not my original writeup but some parts of it are modified as per my Win10 build version. Please kindly visit his blog to see the original writeup.

VEH usage example

LONG NTAPI MyVEHHandler(PEXCEPTION_POINTERS ExceptionInfo) {
  printf("MyVEHHandler (0x%x)\n", ExceptionInfo->ExceptionRecord->ExceptionCode);

  if (ExceptionInfo->ExceptionRecord->ExceptionCode == EXCEPTION_INT_DIVIDE_BY_ZERO) {
    printf("  Divide by zero at 0x%p\n", ExceptionInfo->ExceptionRecord->ExceptionAddress);
    ExceptionInfo->ContextRecord->Eip += 2;
    return EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION;
  }

  return EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_SEARCH;
}

int main() {
  AddVectoredExceptionHandler(1, MyVEHHandler);
  int except = 5;
  except /= 0;
  return 0;
}

There are also applications that uses this method to other matters, such as Cheat Engine to bypass basic debugger checks.

Cheat Engine VEH Debugger

Exception Path

When a CPU exception occurs, the kernel will call the function KiDispatchException (ring0) which will follow this exception to the ntdll method KiUserExceptionDispatcher (ring3). This function will call RtlDispatchException which will try to handle it via the VEH. To do it, it will read the VEH chained list via RtlCallVectoredHandlers and calling each handlers until one return EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION. If a handler returned EXCEPTION_CONTINUE_EXECUTION, the function RtlCallVectoredContinueHandlers is called and it will call all the continue exception handlers.

Exception Path

The VEH handlers are important because the SEH handlers are called only if no VEH handler has caught the exception, so it could be the best method to catch all exceptions if you don’t want to hook KiUserExceptionDispatcher. If you want more information about the exceptions dispatcher, 0vercl0ck has made a good paper about it.

The chained list

The VEH list is a circular linked list with the handlers functions pointers encoded:

Chained List

The exception handlers are encoded with a process cookie but you can decode them easily. If you are dumping the VEH which is inside your own process, you can just use DecodePointer and you don’t have to care about the process cookie. If it’s a remote process you can use DecodeRemotePointer but you will need to create your own function pointer with GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll") and GetProcAddress("DecodeRemotePointer").

The solution that I have chosen is to imitate DecodePointer by getting the process cookie with ZwQueryProcessInformation and applying the same algorithm:

RtlDecodePointer
DWORD Process::GetProcessCookie() const {
  DWORD cookie = 0;
  DWORD return_length = 0;

  HMODULE ntdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
  _NtQueryInformationProcess NtQueryInformationProcess =
      reinterpret_cast<_NtQueryInformationProcess>(
          GetProcAddress(ntdll, "NtQueryInformationProcess"));

  NTSTATUS success = NtQueryInformationProcess(
      process_handle_, ProcessCookie, &cookie, sizeof(cookie), &return_length);
  if (success < 0) {
    return 0;
  }
  return cookie;
}

#define ROR(x, y) ((unsigned)(x) >> (y) | (unsigned)(x) << 32 - (y))
DWORD Process::DecodePointer(DWORD pointer) {
  if (!process_cookie_) {
    process_cookie_ = GetProcessCookie();
    if (!process_cookie_) {
      return 0;
    }
  }

  unsigned char shift_size = 0x20 - (process_cookie_ & 0x1f);
  return ROR(pointer, shift_size) ^ process_cookie_;
}

Finding the VEH list offset

Even if you can find the symbol LdrpVectorHandlerList in the ntdll pdb, there is no official API to get it easily. My solution is to begin by getting a pointer to RtlpAddVectoredHandler:

RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler

You can disassemble the method RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler until you find the instruction call or you can just pretend that its address is always at 0x16 bytes after it:

BYTE* add_exception_handler = reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(
    GetProcAddress(ntdll, "RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler"));
BYTE* add_exception_handler_sub =
    add_exception_handler + 0x16;  // RtlpAddVectoredHandler

And from here the same byte offset method could work, but a simple signature system could prevent us to be broken after a small Windows update:

_LdrpVectorHandlerList
const BYTE pattern_list[] = {
    0x89, 0x46, 0x10,          // mov [esi+10h], eax
    0x81, 0xc3, 0, 0, 0, 0  // add ebx, offset LdrpVectorHandlerList
};
const char mask_list[] = "xxxxx????";
BYTE* match_list =
    SearchPattern(add_exception_handler_sub, 0x100, pattern_list, mask_list);
BYTE* veh_list = *reinterpret_cast<BYTE**>(match_list + 5);
size_t veh_list_offset = veh_list - reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(ntdll);
printf("LdrpVectorHandlerList: 0x%p (ntdll+0x%x)\n", veh_list, veh_list_offset);

Final code

#define ROR(x, y) ((unsigned)(x) >> (y) | (unsigned)(x) << 32 - (y))

DWORD Process::GetProcessCookie() const {
  DWORD cookie = 0;
  DWORD return_length = 0;

  HMODULE ntdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
  _NtQueryInformationProcess NtQueryInformationProcess =
      reinterpret_cast<_NtQueryInformationProcess>(
          GetProcAddress(ntdll, "NtQueryInformationProcess"));

  NTSTATUS success = NtQueryInformationProcess(
      process_handle_, ProcessCookie, &cookie, sizeof(cookie), &return_length);
  if (success < 0) {
    return 0;
  }
  return cookie;
}

DWORD Process::DecodePointer(DWORD pointer) {
  if (!process_cookie_) {
    process_cookie_ = GetProcessCookie();
    if (!process_cookie_) {
      return 0;
    }
  }

  unsigned char shift_size = 0x20 - (process_cookie_ & 0x1f);
  return ROR(pointer, shift_size) ^ process_cookie_;
}

typedef struct _VECTORED_HANDLER_ENTRY {
  _VECTORED_HANDLER_ENTRY* next;
  _VECTORED_HANDLER_ENTRY* previous;
  ULONG refs;
  PVECTORED_EXCEPTION_HANDLER handler;
} VECTORED_HANDLER_ENTRY;

typedef struct _VECTORED_HANDLER_LIST {
  void* mutex_exception;
  VECTORED_HANDLER_ENTRY* first_exception_handler;
  VECTORED_HANDLER_ENTRY* last_exception_handler;
  void* mutex_continue;
  VECTORED_HANDLER_ENTRY* first_continue_handler;
  VECTORED_HANDLER_ENTRY* last_continue_handler;
} VECTORED_HANDLER_LIST;

DWORD GetVEHOffset() {
  HMODULE ntdll = LoadLibraryA("ntdll.dll");
  printf("ntdll: 0x%p\n", ntdll);
  perror_if_invalid(ntdll, "LoadLibrary");

  BYTE* add_exception_handler = reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(
      GetProcAddress(ntdll, "RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler"));
  printf("RtlAddVectoredExceptionHandler: 0x%p\n", add_exception_handler);
  perror_if_invalid(add_exception_handler, "GetProcAddress");

  BYTE* add_exception_handler_sub = add_exception_handler + 0x16;
  printf("RtlpAddVectoredExceptionHandler: 0x%p\n", add_exception_handler_sub);

  const BYTE pattern_list[] = {
      0x89, 0x46, 0x10,          // mov [esi+10h], eax
      0x81, 0xc3, 0,    0, 0, 0  // add ebx, offset LdrpVectorHandlerList
  };
  const char mask_list[] = "xxxxx????";
  BYTE* match_list =
      SearchPattern(add_exception_handler_sub, 0x100, pattern_list, mask_list);
  perror_if_invalid(match_list, "SearchPattern");
  BYTE* veh_list = *reinterpret_cast<BYTE**>(match_list + 5);
  size_t veh_list_offset = veh_list - reinterpret_cast<BYTE*>(ntdll);
  printf("LdrpVectorHandlerList: 0x%p (ntdll+0x%x)\n", veh_list,
         veh_list_offset);

  return veh_list_offset;
}

int main() {
  auto process = Process::GetProcessByName(L"veh_dumper.exe");
  perror_if_invalid(process.get(), "GetProcessByName");
  printf("Process cookie: 0x%0x\n", process->GetProcessCookie());

  DWORD ntdll = process->GetModuleBase(L"ntdll.dll");
  VECTORED_HANDLER_LIST handler_list;
  DWORD veh_addr = ntdll + GetVEHOffset();
  printf("VEH: 0x%08x\n", veh_addr);
  process->ReadProcMem(veh_addr, &handler_list, sizeof(handler_list));
  printf("First entry: 0x%p\n", handler_list.first_exception_handler);
  printf("Last entry: 0x%p\n", handler_list.last_exception_handler);

  if (reinterpret_cast<DWORD>(handler_list.first_exception_handler) ==
      veh_addr + sizeof(DWORD)) {
    printf("VEH list is empty\n");
    return 0;
  }

  printf("Dumping the entries:\n");
  VECTORED_HANDLER_ENTRY entry;
  process->ReadProcMem(
      reinterpret_cast<DWORD>(handler_list.first_exception_handler), &entry,
      sizeof(entry));
  while (true) {
    DWORD handler = reinterpret_cast<DWORD>(entry.handler);
    printf("  handler = 0x%p => 0x%p\n", handler,
           process->DecodePointer(handler));

    if (reinterpret_cast<DWORD>(entry.next) == veh_addr + sizeof(DWORD)) {
      break;
    }
    process->ReadProcMem(reinterpret_cast<DWORD>(entry.next), &entry,
                         sizeof(entry));
  }
}

POC

Game that uses VEH

With this, I can now walk through VEH and reverse what does the handlers do.
Again, this is not my original writeup, all credits goes to Dimitri Fourny.

Thank you for reading! I hope you’ve enjoyed 🙂